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SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
VOLUME

1977

29

NUMBER 1

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
I.
A.

TAX

Power to Consume

In a per curiam decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court
adopted the order of the Richland County Court of Common
Pleas, upholding the assessment of an estate tax deficiency
against the estate of Charles M. Middlebrooks. The issue in
Harperv. South Carolina Tax Commission' was whether the deceased possessed a general power of appointment over the entire
corpus of a trust, thus causing it to be included in his gross estate
for purposes of taxation. If the deceased's power to consume was
limited to approved, ascertainable standards, only one-half of the
trust assets would be included in the gross estate. This was held
2
not to be the case.
In 1965, Mrs. Lelia B. Middlebrooks, age eighty-five, purported to place in trust her rental properties, which comprised
approximately ninety percent of her owned property. Her eightyfive year old husband, the deceased, was named trustee. Under
the terms of the trust both were named co-beneficiaries for life,
then the property was to pass to the survivor of the two for life.
At the death of the survivor, the trust was to terminate, and its
assets were to be distributed to various relatives. Further, if Mr.
Middlebrooks were the survivor, he would be given a general
power of appointment over one-half of the corpus; taxes were to
be paid from the other half of the corpus which was not subject
to the power of appointment. 3 The trust also contained an acknowledgment that the trust property was "accumulated largely
through the efforts, direction, and cooperation of my beloved husband." 4 The trust was not recorded until 1967, after Mrs. Middle1. 267 S.C. 144, 226 S.E.2d 699 (1976).
2. Id. at 147, 226 S.E.2d at 701.
3. Record at 8-9. The purpose of this provision was to qualify the trust for the marital
deduction. Id. at 13.
4. Id. at 7.
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brooks had already made four transfers of trust assets in her own
name .'

South Carolina has adopted, by reference, valuation of estate
assets by federal estate tax laws.' Assets controlled by a general
power of appointment are included in the gross estate of a deceased by section 2041(b) of the Internal Revenue Code. A power
to consume is deemed a general power of appointment, and thus
part of the gross estate, unless it "is limited by an ascertainable
standard relating to the health, education, support or maintenance of the decedent." 7 The court in Harper reasoned that because South Carolina has incorporated the federal law on powers
of appointment, the state's standards in defining such powers
must be "at least as stringent at those prescribed by Federal
law."'
The proper concern is not with the definition under South Carolina law of a general power of appointment, but is rather with
whether under South Carolina law, Mr. Middlebrooks possessed
a right to invade the corpus of the aforementioned trust beyond
the standard of support and maintenance fixed by the taxing
statute?
Because the lower court felt that the instrument was ambiguous as to whether or not the power to consume or invade ° was
broader than the standard prescribed in section 2041(b)(1), it
examined and emphasized the circumstances surrounding the
making of the instrument," following the supreme court's mandate in Shelley v. Shelley 2 that an ambiguous instrument must
be so construed as to carry out the intention of the maker. In
interpreting the instrument, the court focused on the following
circumstances.
First, and most important, the court found a "striking contrast" 3 between paragraphs two and three of the trust instru5. 267 S.C. at 149, 226 S.E.2d at 702. When Mrs. Middlebrooks died in 1969, her

estate received a marital deduction for the trust assets. Brief for Appellants at 2.
6. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-15-40 (1976).

7. I.R.C. § 2041(b)(1)(A).
8. 267 S.C. at 148, 226 S.E.2d at 701 (quoting Lehman v. United States, 448 F.2d
1318, 1319 (5th Cir. 1971)).
9. Id.
10. The court used the terms "power to consume" and "power to invade" interchangeably throughout its opinion.
11. 267 S.C. at 149, 226 S.E.2d at 701-02.
12. 248 S.C. 598, 137 S.E.2d 851 (1964).
13. 267 S.C. at 151, 226 S.E.2d at 703.
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ment. Paragraph two gave the trustee, the deceased, the power
to distribute income from the trust for "support and maintenance"; " paragraph three empowered the trustee to invade the
corpus for "maintenance and support or for any other expenses.""
The lower court's decision was grounded primarily on the interpretation of the phrase "or any other expenses,"'' found in paragraph three. The remaining three circumstances on which the
court based its decision reflect how this phrase should be interpreted.
Plaintiffs advocated resolving the uncertainty of the phrase
by relying on the rule of ejusdem generis.'7 They argued this rule
limited the phrase "or any other expenses" to support and maintenance, "because there is no other language available to modify
it grammatically, and thus give it meaning."'" The plaintiffs further attempted to clarify the phrase by explaining that the settlor
intended the income to be used first, and afterwards the principal
to be used (1) for support and maintenance when the income
proved to be insufficient, and (2) for extraordinary expenses. 6 In
rejecting this interpretation, the court held that rules of construction are "subservient to the paramount consideration of determining what [she] meant by the terms used in [her trust].""O
The court further noted that the application of the rule of
ejusdem generis in this context is limited: strict adherence to the
standard of support and maintenance is necessary to take the
assets controlled by a power out of the gross estate.2'
14. Id. at 149, 226 S.E.2d at 701 (quoting Record at 7-8).
15. Id. at 148, 226 S.E.2d at 701 (quoting Record at 8).
16. Id. Although the court seemed to speak in terms of the ambiguity between paragraphs 2 and 3, it actually focused on the ambiguous meaning of"or any other expenses."
17. Id. at 150, 226 S.E.2d at 702. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 608 (4th ed. rev. 1968)
defines the doctrine of ejusdem generis as follows:
In the construction of laws, wills, and other instruments, the "ejusdem
generis rule" is, that where general words follow an enumeration of persons or
things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are
not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only
to persons or things of the same general kind or class as those specifically
mentioned.
18. Brief of Appellants at 7 (italics omitted).
19. Id. at 16. 20. 267 S.C. at 150, 226 S.E.2d at 702 (citing Rogers v. Rogers, 221 S.C. 360, 336, 70
S.E.2d 637, 640 (1952)).
21. Miller v. United States, 387 F.2d 866 (3d Cir. 1968). See Lehman v. United
States, 448 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir. 1971); Peoples Trust Co. of Bergen County v. United
States, 412 F.2d 1156 (3d Cir. 1969); Strite v. McGinnes, 330 F.2d 234 (3d Cir. 1964), reh.
denied, 379 U.S. 910 (1964); Stafford v. United States, 236 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Wis. 1964).
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Second, the court gave "much weight" to the fact that "Mr.
Middlebrooks was without question the first object of his wife's
affections and bounty, 2' 2 evidenced by the express acknowledgment in the trust, the childlessness of the couple, and the gift to
collateral relatives upon the termination of the trust. 3 It has been
similarly held that the language of a trust is to be given a broad
construction whenever the possessor of the general power is also
the main object of the trust. 4
Third, the lower court felt that the following circumstances
in existence at the time of the creation of the trust were indicative
of the settlor's intent not to limit the power to consume to only
support and maintenance: (1) The advanced age (eighty-fiVe
years) of the couple, and (2) "the value of the assets placed in the
trust as compared to her total worth.""'
Lastly, Mrs. Middlebrooks' actions of waiting two years before recording the trust and, in the meantime, transferring trust
assets in her own name were taken as signs that her true intent
was not to limit the withdrawal power to support and maintenance. "If she did not intend to so limit herself, she certainly did
not intend to limit her husband who was a co-beneficiary." 2 6
B.

Trial by Jury; A "New Business"

In C. W. Matthews Contracting Co. v. South Carolina Tax
7 the court held that a taxpayer
Commission,"
has no right to a
trial by jury for a determination of the propriety of his tax assessment. The court further ruled that in order for a taxpayer's alleged new business to carry its losses forward for three years, its
status as a new business must be determined on the basis of its
initial year of operation."
In 1964, Matthews, a Georgia roadbuilding corporation, submitted bids for the construction of Highway 1-20 in Richland
County. On January 4, 1965, it began work on this job, which
eventually lasted three years. Although it utilized the local labor
force and bought equipment from local dealers, the project super22. 267 S.C. at 150, 226 S.E.2d at 702.
23. Id. at 150-51, 226 S.E.2d at 702.
24. Strite v. McGinnes, 330 F.2d 234 (3d Cir. 1964), reh. denied, 379 U.S. 910 (1964);
accord, Moody v. Tedder, 16 S.C. 557 (1882).
25. 267 S.C. at 151, 226 S.E.2d at 703.
26. Id. at 150, 226 S.E.2d at 702.
27. S.C. -,
230 S.E.2d 223 (1976).
28. Id. at
, 230 S.E.2d at 226.
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visor lived in South Carolina only during the week. The company
maintained a mobile office on the job site. Even though the 1-20
job was the company's only work in South Carolina in 1965, it did
submit bids for other contracts, and it continuously operated in
South Carolina from 1965 to 1976.
Startup costs for the project were considerable. During its
,first three years of South Carolina operations, Matthews lost approximately $722,000. In 1969 and in 1970, Matthews took a deduction for the losses it had sustained in 1965, 1966, and 1967,29
relying on section 65-259(12)(a) of the South Carolina Code."
When this deduction was disallowed by the Tax Commission,
Matthews paid the assessed taxes and brought a recovery action.3 ' At the trial, plaintiff's only witness, Robert E. Matthews,
president of the firm, testified that it was the intent of the company officials in 1964 and 1965 to operate its business in South
Carolina on a permanent basis.32 The supreme court rejected the
plaintiff's assignments of error and held as follows.
1. There is no right to a trial by jury in a statutory action
to recover taxes.-Although the seventh amendment 3 proclaims
the preservation of jury trials in common law actions, the right
to trial by jury is not guaranteed in any state cases.34 However,
the South Carolina Constitution provides that "the right of trial
by jury shall be preserved inviolate." 35 In arguing for a liberal
construction of this provision, Matthews stated:
It is the appellant's view that it is essential to the preservation
of the basic rights and liberties of the citizens of this State that
this provision of our Constitution be liberally construed to afford
all parties the right to trial by jury where factual matters are in
dispute unless there is a specific state prohibition, or the right
clearly did not exist at common law. 6
29. Id. at

-,

230 S.E.2d at 224.

30. S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-259(12)(a) (1962) (current version at

§ 12-7-700(12)(a)

(1976)).
31. Id. at § 12-47-210.
32. S.C. at -, 230 S.E.2d at 224-25.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. VII provides:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according
to the rules of the common law.
34. 47 AM. JUR. 2d Jury § 9 (1969).
35. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 14.
36. Brief of Appellant at 7.
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The court had previously interpreted this section as preserving
the right to a jury trial in only two situations. First, when the
right existed at the time of the adoption of the constitution, it is
still in force.3" This was not the case in Matthews.8 Second, when
there is a statutory proceeding in the nature of a common law
action, the party has a right to a jury trial.3 9 In Matthews it was
disputed whether the right to recover taxes was by nature a common law action.
In denying the company's allegation that the suit at bar was
a common law debt action, the court rested its decision on several
grounds. First, the court relied on the Washington State case of
Dexter Horton Building Co. v. King County.40 Dexter Horton was
persuasive because Washington has a similar constitutional provision and a similar recovery statute. The Washington court, in
refusing a jury trial, held that a tax recovery suit is based on the
equitable principle of constructive fraud, because taxes are in
trust and the state cannot receive interest on delinquent taxes
absent a statutory provision." "The erroneous collection of taxes
can be likened to breach of the duty to assess only that which is
owed. The res of the trust is established by the requirement of
earmarking the protected funds." 2 To further buttress its holding, the court in Matthews analogized South Carolina's position
to that of the federal system. The court used the Supreme Court's
ruling that there is no seventh amendment requirement that a
plaintiff be provided a jury trial "in a statutory action to recover
taxes allegedly unjustly collected" 43 to hold that South Carolina's
due process requirement is similar to the federal requirement in
this respect. To reach its conclusion that Matthews was not entitled to a jury trial, the court further relied on a ninth circuit case
37. S.C. at ., 230 S.E.2d at 225; see McGlohon v. Harlan, 254 S.C. 207, 174
S.E.2d 753 (1970); Richards v. City of Columbia, 227 S.C. 538, 88 S.E.2d 683 (1955); State
v. Gibbes, 109 S.C. 135, 95 S.E. 346 (1918); Smith & Co. v. Bryce, 17 S.C. 538 (1882);
Commissioners of New Town Cut v. Seabrook, 33 S.C.L. (2 Strob.) 560 (1846).
38. Brief of Respondent at 3; see S.C. at -, 230 S.E.2d at 225.
39. S.C. at -, 230 S.E.2d at 225.
40. 10 Wash.2d 186, 116 P.2d 507 (1941).
41. Id. The South Carolina Supreme Court has also held that there is no right to
recover interest on taxes paid under protest without specific statutory authority. Colonial
Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 233 S.C. 129, 103 S.E.2d 908
(1958), cited in United States v. Livingston, 179 F. Supp. 9 (E.D.S.C. 1959).
42. Brief of Respondent at 4.
43. S.C. at -,
230 S.E.2d at 226 (citing Wickwire v. Reinecks, 275 U.S. 101
(1927)).
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that held that a proceeding to recover taxes was not a common
law debt action. 4
2. Only evidence of the initialyear of an alleged new business may be used to determine whether it was, in fact, a new
business.-In determining whether Matthews established a new
business within the meaning of section 65-259(12), the court
adopted the following definition of "to establish": "to bring
usually as permanent or with permanence in view."' 5 Thus, although the court considered Matthews's intent to initiate a new
business (as evidenced by Mr. Matthews's testimony) as relevant
to show intent, it held that the post-1965 business activities were
irrelevant because the company's status as a new business had to
be determined on the basis of its initial year of operation. In other
words, the determination of whether plaintiff had established a
new business in 1965 had to be made at the beginning of 1966.
The court felt that the legislature had intended this result in
order to preserve both the fairness and workability of the statute.4" "The luxury of hindsight is not present. If establishment
need not occur until later years, a state of limbo would exist...
which would render the statute completely unworkable."4
But even if the lower court had erred in refusing to admit
evidence of post-1965 activities, the error was harmless, according
to the court, because the evidence did not prove the establishment of a new business. It merely showed that Matthews was
"pursuing its existing business."4 8
3. Evidence Matthews presented of its 1965 activities was
not sufficient to show it intended to establish a new
business.-"Considering the nature of the road-building business,"49 the court believed that the plaintiff merely expanded its
range of competition, rather than established a new business. As
stated by the trial judge,
it simply continued its existing business which is located in
Marietta by undertaking a single job in Richland County. The
only other activity in this State was some unsuccessful bidding
44.
- S.C. at -_, 230 S.E.2d at 226 (citing Olshausen v. C.I.R., 273 F.2d 23 (9th
Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 820 (1960)).

45.

-

S.C. at

-,

DICTIONARY 778 (1976)).
46.S.C. at -,

230 S.E.2d at 226 (quoting

WEBSTER's THIRD INTERNATIONAL

230 S.E.2d at 226-27.

47. Brief of Respondent at 8.
48. 49. Id.

S.C. at

-,

230 S.E.2d at 227.
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which, although it may raise a doubt, is not enough to bring the
taxpayer within the terms of the statute. This bidding is itself
preliminary in nature and leads to no connotation of permanence. The fact that the plaintiff did business here from January
4, 1965, until November 29, 1965 (the date Matthews filed domestication papers), without authorization also shows a lack of
commitment here.50
The court also felt that a ruling in plaintiff's favor would violate both a statutory rule of construction and the intent of the
legislature. While admitting that the interpretation of what is a
new business within the meaning of the statute was ambiguous,
the court recognized that "[tihe rule generally applicable in the
construction of income tax statutes that ambiguities are to be
resolved in favor of the taxpayer . . . does not apply in the construction of a statute authorizing deductions; rather, the ambiguity will be resolved against the taxpayer." 5 ' The court also emphasized the importance of the legislative intent "to encourage
the establishment of new businesses and industries and thereby
provide employment and ultimately additional revenue. "52 To
hold that Matthews set up a new business in 1965 would put a
resident business at a competitive disadvantage, according to the
court, because a resident in similar circumstances would be
merely extending its already established business.53
Apparently, intent to establish a new business in South Carolina is not sufficient to qualify a company for the § 65-259(12)
deduction. The court based its holding on the legislative intent
of protecting resident companies while simultaneously encouraging new business. It gave little weight to the evidence of the
company's intent to establish a new business-the testimony of
the executives and the intent evidenced by the domestication
papers, both of which met the court's definition of "to establish."
The court seemingly emphasizes "new business" rather than "to
establish a new business." Its language indicates that it considers
"new business" to mean a new line of business rather than a new
place of business. However, such a holding could arguably be
50, Record at 66.
51. 47 C.J.S. Internal Revenue § 230 (1946) (cited in Southern Soya Corp. of Cameron
v. Wasson, 252 S.C. 484, 167 S.E.2d 311 (1969)).
230 S.E.2d at 227. See Chronicle Publishers, Inc. v. South
52. S.C. at -,
Carolina Tax Comm'n, 244 S.C. 192, 194, 136 S.E.2d 261, 262 (1964).
53.

-

S.C. at -,

230 S.E.2d at 227.
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restricted to the facts of the instant and similar cases, since the
court did consider the transient nature of the road construction
industry.
C. Apportionment
in another tax case, the supreme court considered the constitutionality of a nonapportioned ad valorem property tax in light
of the right to due process. No prior South Carolina decision had
dealt with the issue of whether due process requires the apportionment of personal property taxes, nor had any statute authorized such an apportionment. Thus, in Atkinson Dredging Co. v.
Thomas,54 the court declared "that if the tax levied on Atkinson's
equipment could not be constitutionally levied on a nonapportionment basis, it must fail. We are unaware of any case in
which the Court has attempted to remedy a defect in the taxing
statute by ordering an apportionment."55 After careful scrutiny of
all arguments, the court upheld the validity of the nonapportioned tax.
Atkinson was a Florida corporation in the business of dredging navigable waterways and maintained its principal place of
business in Virginia. Pursuant to a contract with the United
States Army Corps of Engineers, it began dredging operations in
Charleston Harbor in September 1970. On December 31, 1970, its
equipment was assessed by Charleston County for the 1971 tax
year." On February 5, 1971, plaintiff completed work on the project and removed its equipment from the county.57 After paying
the tax under protest, Atkinson sued for recovery of a portion of
the money it had paid. In the suit, both parties stipulated that
the equipment had a tax situs in Charleston County and that
plaintiff paid property taxes on the same equipment in Virginia
in 1971. The lower court upheld the county tax assessor's assessment of a non-apportioned tax.5
Atkinson's first assignment of error was that the due process
provisions of both the federal and state constitutions59 require
54. 266 S.C. 361, 223 S.E.2d 592 (1976).
55. Id. at 365, 223 S.E.2d at 594.
56. Id. at 363-64, 223 S.E.2d at 593. The assessment was pursuant to S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 12-37-900 (1976).
57. Record at 20.
58. 266 S.C. at 363, 223 S.E.2d at 593.
59. Id. at 364, 223 S.E.2d at 594. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in relevant
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apportionment when property subject to an ad valorem tax is
physically present within the taxing jurisdiction for only a portion
of the taxable year. In examining the merits of this contention,
the court relied on the standard set forth by the Supreme Court
in Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co.:60
That test is whether property was taken without due process of
law, or, if paraphrase we must, whether the taxing power exerted by the state bears fiscal relation to protection, opportunities and benefits given by the state. The simple but controlling
question is whether the state has given anything for which it can
ask return.'
The court discounted plaintiffs cases that used the Penney
test to require apportionment of taxes when the property was
within more than one jurisdiction in a taxable year because all
of the cases involved issues of interstate commerce as well as
issues of due process. 2 "These cases, however, are readily distinguishable from the instant case in that the items sought to be
taxed consisted of equipment which were per se engaged in interstate commerce. . . .Atkinson does not contend any of its property was engaged in interstate commerce during the period its
6' 3
equipment was in the county.
Atkinson, in effect, conceded that Charleston County met
the Penney test of compliance with due process by stipulating
part: "[Nlor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law."
S.C. CONST. art. I, § 3 reads as follows: "The privileges and immunities of citizens of
this State and of the United States under this Constitution shall not be abridged, nor shall
any person be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."
60. 311 U.S. 435 (1940), reh. denied, 312 U.S. 712 (1941).
61. Id. at 444.
62. See Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Board of Equalization & Assessment,
347 U.S. 590 (1954); Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169, reh. denied,
336 U.S. 928 (1949); Flying Tiger Line v. County of Los Angeles, 51 Cal. 2d 314, 333 P.2d
323 (1958); Slick Airways v. County of Los Angeles, 140 Cal. App. 2d 311, 295 P.2d 46
(1956); Billings Transfer Corp. v. County of Davidson, 276 N.C. 19, 170 S.E.2d 873 (1969).
63. 266 S.C. at 367, 223 S.E.2d at 595. In making this distinction of plaintiff's cases,
the court rejected Atkinson's argument that "recent decisions ... turn on the question
of whether or not the taxpayer received benefits or protection from more than one state,
not whether or not the taxpayer was engaged in interstate commerce. Engagement in
interstate commerce is per se insignificant." Brief of Appellant at 17 (emphasis omitted).
Although Atkinson spoke generally in terms of its business being identical to one in
interstate commerce (Brief of Appellant at 10), it did not except to the trial court's finding
that it was not engaged in interstate commerce. Record at 69-70; Brief of Respondent at
304.
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that it was afforded "opportunities, benefits and protections"' 4 of
the county and state. There was no showing that the tax on Atkinson's equipment" 'clearly results in, such flagrant and palpable inequality between the burden imposed and the benefit received, as to amount to the arbitrary taking of property without
compensation,' "65 such a showing being necessary for the tax to
be held violative of due process. Although the county and state
may have received more benefits than did Atkinson Dredging,
this was held not sufficient to invalidate the tax."6
Atkinson's second assignment of error was that the court was
estopped from taxing its property on a nonapportioned basis because a 1970 court order had required apportionment of Atkinson's property taxes under similar circumstances. (This order was
not appealed.) In rejecting plaintiff's contention, the court based
its decision on policy grounds and dictated that estoppel by judgment should be frugally applied in tax cases.67 Quoting a Ninth
Circuit case, the court stated:
"[W]e conclude that the rule, as applied in tax litigation, is
sufficiently elastic to permit of the balancing of conveniences
and the weighing of other considerations as against that of desired repose [estoppel by judgment] .

. .

. Thus in tax contro-

versies of this character, when courts undertake to bestow on
either party a vested right in an erroneous decision of law, they
are apt, by multiplying the issues, merely to add fuel to the
controversy.""8
II.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

A.

Lump-Sum Payment

In Ashley v. Ware Shoals Manufacturing Co., 9 the supreme
court set forth the general rule that a lump-sum payment of a
64. 266 S.C. at 368, 223 S.E.2d at 595 (citing Record at 20).
65. 266 S.C. at 368, 223 S.E.2d at 596 (quoting Dane v. Jackson, 256 U.S. 589 (1921));
accord, Sanders v. Greater Greenville Sewer Dist., 211 S.C. 141, 44 S.E.2d 185 (1947).
66. 266 S.C. at 367-68, 223 S.E.2d at 595.
67. Id. at 371, 223 S.E.2d at 597. In basing its decision on policy grounds, the court

disregarded both the county's allegation of factual differences between the two proceedings, id., and Atkinson's argument that "[tihe law should triumph over policy considera-

tions, such as administrative hardship, the possibility of congressional action and the
hardship which might be caused a county by a court ruling that it has no right to collect
an unconstitutional tax." Brief of Appellant at 7-8.
68. 266 S.C. at 371, 223 S.E.2d at 597 (quoting Henricksen v. Seward, 135 F.2d 986
(9th Cir. 1943)).
69. 210 S.C. 273, 42 S.E.2d 390 (1947).
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workmen's compensation award will be allowed only in the unusual case that necessitates such form of payment in order to serve
the best interests of the employee or his dependents. 0 Now the
court has refined this rule by holding in Woods v. Sumter StressCrete7' that the desire to pay off outstanding debts and invest the
remaining sum does not constitute such an unusual case.
When Ernest Woods died in 1972 as a result of injuries received in the course of his employment with the defendant, Sumter Stress-Crete, the Industrial Commission awarded his widow
and two minor children death benefits of $63.00 per week for 400
weeks, the sum not to exceed $25,000. A year later, Mrs. Woods,
on behalf of herself and her children, applied for the payment of
the award to be in lump-sum, rather than periodic, form. The
Commission granted her request and the lower court affirmed."
Section 42-9-300 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina authorizes the Commission to permit the lump-sum payment of
benefits as follows:
Whenever any weekly payment has been continued for not less
than six weeks, the liability therefor may, in unusual cases,
when the employee so requests and the Commission deems it to
be to the best interest of the employee or his dependents,...
be redeemed, in whole or in part, by the payment by the employer of a lump sum which shall be fixed by the Commission.73
The rationale behind this statute is grounded in the underlying
principle of workmen's compensation: the protection of income.
"Experience has taught that this income-protection is best accomplished through periodic income payments. '' 74 As noted by
the court in Ashley:
Undoubtedly it was intended that periodic payments should be
the rule and lump-sum settlements the exception. The principle
involved in the compensation acts is that the benefits received
are a substitute for the wages of the injured employee, and with
this theory in mind almost all of the legislative bodies of the
70. Id.
71. 266 S.C. 245, 222 S.E.2d 760 (1976).
72. Id. at 247, 222 S.E.2d at 760-61.
73. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-300 (1976). See also 266 S.C. at 248, 222 S.E.2d at 761;
Ashley v. Ware Shoals Mfg. Co., 210 S.C. at 280-82, 42 S.E.2d at 393-94; accord, Brown
v. Plowden Co., 216 S.C. 114, 117, 57 S.E.2d 29, 30 (1949) (quoting Ashley v. Ware Shoals
Mfg. Co.).
74. 266 S.C. at 247, 222 S.E.2d at 761.
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various States have provided for the payment of compensation
in regular installments. The purpose of this method is to prevent
an imprudent employee or dependent from wasting the means
75
for his support and thereby becoming a burden upon society.

Two procedural rules are of significance in a case involving
an application for lump-sum payment. First, the burden of proving facts to justify such an award rests on the claimants.7 1 Second,
unlike the normal rule that the court must uphold the Commission's finding if any competent evidence supports it, 77 the court
in a case involving an application for a lump-sum payment of

benefits is "empowered to review the record and determine
whether the action of the Commission constituted an abuse of
discretion. 78s Because the claimants in Woods did not produce
sufficient evidence to show that this was an appropriate case for
a lump-sum award, 79 the court found that the Industrial Commission "abused its discretion" and, accordingly, reversed the Com80
mission's decision.
Mrs. Woods's first three reasons for requesting a lump-sum
settlement involved indebtedness.81 First, she wanted to pay the
outstanding mortgage on the house inherited by her and her children jointly. 2 Second, she wished to repay two loans, one for
house repairs and the other for automobile repairs, that she had
obtained from finance companies.8 Third, she desired to pay the
75. 210 S.C. at 280, 42 S.E.2d at 393.
76. 266 S.C. at 248, 222 S.E.2d.at 761; Ashley v. Ware Shoals Mfg. Co., 210 S.C. at
289, 42 S.E.2d at 397; accord, Brown v. Plowden Co., 216 S.C. at 118, 57 S.E.2d at 31.
77. See, e.g., Lorick v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 245 S.C. 513, 518, 141 S.E.2d
662, 664 (1965); Jake v. Jones, 240 S.C. 574, 579, 126 S.E.2d 721, 722-23 (1962).
78. 226 S.C. at 248, 222 S.E.2d at 761 (quoting Ashley v. Ware Shoals Mfg. Co., 210
S.C. at 289, 42 S.E.2d at 397).
79. An appropriate case is an extraordinary, or unusual, one.
80. 266 S.C. at 248, 222 S.E.2d at 761.
81. Id. at 248-49, 222 S.E.2d at 761-62.
82. Counsel for plaintiff had argued that paying off a mortgage on the family home
was not a mere desire to pay a debt; rather, it was a way of protecting the family's interest
in the property and assuring them of a home. Brief of Respondents at 3. Counsel for the
Commission countered by saying this contention was speculative only, but admitted that
"[ilf the respondents were in danger of losing their home because of their inability to
meet the mortgage payments on account of the death or disability of the family breadwinner, an unusual circumstance might exist within the meaning of the statute." Brief of
Appellants at 7.
As to the question of whether a lump-sum payment will be granted for the purpose
of paying the mortgage on a residence, see generally 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation
§ 343 (1958) and cases cited therein.
83. Professor Larson has remarked that "it seems wrong to use lump sums to enable
a claimant to pay past debts, although there is no lack of cases in which this purpose has
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attorneys' fee for representation in this action. 4 Instead of examining each reason separately in order to determine whether it was
"unusual,"' 8 the court looked at the aggregate. After noting that
all three debts were "being retired on a monthly basis," ' the
court scrutinized the mathematics of the Woods's situation and
found that the facts were not so unusual as to require a lump-sum
award:" "The foregoing facts fail to present an exception to the
general rule, adopted by this Court in Ashley, that 'the desire to
pay debts is not regarded as a sufficient ground to justify commutation of compensation payments.' "88
Mrs. Woods's fourth basis for requesting a lump-sum award
was her contention that she would profit, in terms of interest, by
paying her debts and then investing the balance of the award in
a local savings and loan company. The supreme court summarily
disposed of this ground by holding that the alleged profit was not
supported by facts in the record. 9
figured as at least one of the justifications for lump-summing." 3 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LARSONI.

§ 82.72 (1952) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as 3

The following sources note the difference of opinion as to whether or not indebtedness
is a sufficient ground for lump-sum treatment. 82 AM. JUR. 2d Workmen's Compensation
§ 654 (1976); Annot., 69 A.L.R. 547 (1930); 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 343
(1958).
84. 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 343 (1958) lists Ashley as supporting the
proposition that attorney fees may be a sufficient reason for lump-summing, but payment
of debt is not.
85. The court looked at the facts involving each reason, but did not determine
whether each ground alone was unusual within the meaning of S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9300 (1976).
86. 266 S.C. at 249, 222 S.E.2d at 762.
87. Id. The court figured the family's monthly finances as follows:
$252.00

periodic payment (at $63.00/week)
(84.00) attorneys' fee (one-third of award)

$600.00

deceased's
monthly wage

$168.00

(508.00)

gross monthly income

340.00

$ 92.00

change in position

$508.00

Social Security benefits
gross monthy income

(121.00) loan payments
$387.00

net monthly income

88. 266 S.C. at 250, 222 S.E.2d at 762 (quoting Ashley v. Ware Shoals Mfg. Co., 210
S.C. at 288, 42 S.E.2d at 396).
89. 266 S.C. at 250, 222 S.E.2d at 762. In Brief of Appellant at 7, counsel for the
Commission had attacked this alleged justification on two grounds: (1) The proposal was
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The court also rejected her fifth basis, the allegation that she
could not be assured of receiving the payment of the entire award
if her application was denied because the defendant was a small,
self-insured company.9" Nothing in the record indicated that the
defendant was in danger of insolvency; the record showed that the
defendant fully complied with section 42-5-20, regulating selfinsurance by a business concern. 9' Had the court allowed conversion to a lump-sum award, it would have undermined both the
requirement for unusualness in section 42-9-300 and the provision
for self-insurance in section 42-5-20: "If the present facts constitute grounds for commutation of payments then every employee
of a self-insured employer would be entitled to have benefits paid
in a lump-sum unless financial guarantee could be given equivalent to federal insurance."9
Even had the court found this to be an unusual case within
the meaning of section 42-9-300, Mrs. Woods's claim would not
have been successful because the court did not believe a lumpsum award to be in the best interest of the dependents. The court
feared that relief afforded by the elimination of monetary pressures on the family would be "temporary only, bringing about
greater economic trouble in the future."93 As Professor Larson has
noted in his treatise:
[I]f one assumes that the purpose of periodic income benefits
is to provide needed ongoing support to a disabled worker, one
can only wonder whether the claimant's current hardship-at a
time when periodic payments were being received-might not
be as nothing when compared with the hardship he would face
later with both his lump sum and his periodic payments gone25
B.

Continuing Medical Expenses

In accordance with its decision in Williams v. Boyle Connot sound because plaintiff lacked investment experience; and (2) the proposal
"disregards the fact that the primary purpose and general scheme of Workmen's Compensation Law is to pay compensation at intervals corresponding to the time the employee
would have received his wages had he not been injured."
90. 266 S.C. at 250, 222 S.E.2d at 762.
91. Id. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-5-20 (1976) provides: "In the case of self-insurers, the
Commission shall require the deposit of an acceptable security, indemnity or bond to
secure the payment of the compensation liabilities as they are incurred."
93. 266 S.C. at 250, 222 S.E.2d at 762.
94. Id.
95. 3 LARSON § 82.72 (1952).
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struction Co." and Dykes v. Daniel Construction Co., 17 the supreme court in Rice v. Froehling & Robertson, Inc.,"8 has reaffirmed its position that an employer is liable beyond the statutory
ten week period for medical expenses that will tend to lessen the
time in which the injured employee is unable to earn wages comparable to those he was receiving at the time of his injury.
In September 1966, a compensable accident left plaintiff a
quadriplegic. Although Rice's maximum income compensation
benefits ended in July 1972, Froehling & Robertson voluntarily
paid his medical expenses through October 1972. On July 1, 1972,
Rice was admitted into the Durham Rehabilitation Center for
various medical and physical therapy treatments. He was still a
patient at the time of the hearing before the Industrial Commission. 1 At the center, Rice learned to do various things designed
to help him become more self-sufficient such as feeding himself
and "hunt and peck typing."'' ° Desiring to have a career in either
mathematics or statistics, he enrolled in several undergraduate
courses and earned A's in nearly every course.' 0'
Doctors at the center recommended that Rice have two operations, which he, in turn, alleged would lessen his period of disability. First, because Rice suffered from chronic urinary infections
due to the use of a catheter, doctors recommended the implantation of a bladder stimulator to control the functioning of his bladder. Second, doctors suggested the embedment of a dorsal column
stimulator to reduce Rice's pain. This device would enable him
to stop taking pain medication which made him drowsy and
thereby interfered with his studies. °2 The Industrial Commission
held Froehling & Robertson liable for the costs of the proposed
operations, certain past medical expenses, and any future care
Rice received at the Durham Rehabilitation Center. The lower
court affirmed.' 3
Section 42-15-60 of the Workmen's Compensation Act provides that an employer is only responsible for medical expenses
for ten weeks from the date of injury unless further treatment
96.
97.
98.
99.

252 S.C. 387, 166 S.E.2d 550 (1969).
262 S.C. 98, 202 S.E.2d 646 (1974).
267 S.C. 155, 226 S.E.2d 705 (1976).
Id. at 158, 226 S.E.2d at 706.

100. Record at 3.
101. 267 S.C. at 160, 226 S.E.2d at 707.
102. Id. at 161-62, 226 S.E.2d at 707-08.
103. Id. at 158, 226 S.E.2d at 706.
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"will tend to lessen the period of disability.""" Disability, for
workmen's compensation purposes, is the "incapacity because of
injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the
time of injury in the same or any other employment.""" Defendant argued that the Commission's authority to order further
payments of expenses ended at the time the defendant finished
paying the maximum income compensation. In contending that
the Commission had no jurisdiction because the relief sought
exceeded that provided by law, Froehling & Robertson connected
medical benefits beyond ten weeks to periods of disability, which
it defined "as that period in which the employer is obligated to
provide income compensation."'' 6 The court expressly rejected
the defendant's position: "The statute does not by its terms
equate an employer's liability for medical treatment to any other
period of liability, for income compensation or otherwise. It specifically defines the period of disability in terms of the time period in which the employee is statutorily incapacitated."''0 7 Thus,
an employer is liable for medical treatment that will lessen the
time its employee is unable to receive those wages he was earning
at the time he was injured.10 Further, the treatment must only
tend to lessen the time of disability; "treatment need not bear a
direct and highly correlative relationship to economic rehabilita-

tion." 0 '

104. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-15-60 (1976).
105. Id. at § 42-1-120 (1976).
106. 267 S.C. at 159, 226 S.E.2d at 706.
The uncontradicted evidence is that the maximum compensation payable
under the law to Respondent was exhausted on July 23, 1971. . . .Thus, as of
July 23, 1971, the maximum period of disability for which compensation was
allowed under our Workmen's Compensation Law had been reached. Since that
time there has been no period of disability provided under the law which could
in any way be lessened by further medical benefits.
Brief of Appellants at 8.
107. 267 S.C. at 195, 226 S.E.2d at 706. See Dykes v. Daniel Constr. Co., 262 S.C.
98, 202 S.E.2d 646 (1974); Williams v. Boyle Constr. Co., 252 S.C. 387, 166 S.E.2d 550
(1969).
108. Id.; S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-120 (1976).
109. 267 S.C. at 159, 226 S.E.2d at 706 (citing Williams v. Boyle Constr. Co., 252 S.C.
387, 167 S.E.2d 550 (1969)). See also Dykes v. Daniel Constr. Co., 262 S.C. 98, 202 S.E.2d
646 (1974).
The court, as it had previously done in Williams, adopted the following definition of
"tend" from BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1637 (4th ed. 1968): "To have a leaning; serve,
contribute, or conduce in some degree or way, or have a more or less direct bearing or
effect; to be directed as to any end, object or purpose; to have a tendency, conscious or
unconscious, to any end, object or purpose."
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The court limited its review of the evidence to two issues:

"whether there is competent testimony to support a conclusion
that the respondent has a reasonable expectation of regaining
economic self-sufficiency and whether the medical treatment
sought is conducive to lessening the period of disability."' 0 With
regard to the first issue, Froehling & Robertson argued that there
was no such reasonable expectation: because Rice was a quadriplegic, he was unemployable, and thus no treatment could tend
to lessen his disability. It distinguished Williams"' by pointing
out that there the court had emphasized the physical rehabilitation of the plaintiff paraplegic, and such rehabilitation was not
possible with Rice. Emphasizing both Rice's character and edu-

cational triumphs, the court rejected defendant's contention and
held that Rice did indeed have a reasonable expectation of future

employability and economic self-sufficiency." 2
With regard to the second issue set forth by the court, i.e.,
whether the proposed medical treatment would tend to lessen the

time of Rice's disability, Froehling & Robertson contended that
since medical treatment could not change Rice's status as a quadriplegic, his period of disability could not be reduced" 3 The court

answered this assertion as follows:
Appellants are correct in this assertion that neither of these
operations will remove the basic physical handicap respondent
must overcome. Nevertheless, each is aimed at removing obstacles which presently interrupt respondent's course of training,
which is designed to make him economically self sufficient. Ac110. 267 S.C. at 161, 226 S.E.2d at 707.
111. In Williams v. Boyle Constr. Co., 252 S.C. at 392-93, 166 S.E.2d at 552-53, the
court had observed:
The extent to which a paraplegic can be restored to his former earning capacity
admittedly depends to a large extent upon the particular individual involved.
While the present claimant is somewhat handicapped by his prior educational
opportunities, we cannot say under this record that there is no basis for a
reasonable expectation that the period of claimant's disability will be lessened
if the additional medical treatment is afforded.
112. 267 S.C. at 161, 226 S.E.2d at 707. The court remarked:
The qualities of character he has demonstrated support the conclusion that he
is capable of acquiring knowledge needed for employment in his now chosen
field. He has shown extreme courage, fortitude and desire, resisted temptations
for self indulgent pity, and demonstrated the intellectual capacity to attain
future gainful employment in an area where his physical handicap might be of
minimal significance.

113. Id.
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cordingly, the operations are reasonably calculated as treatment
which will "tend" to lessen his "disability.""' 4
The defendant did succeed on its final assertion that the
5
"Commission's order for future treatment was too general.""
The court agreed that the order did "not give them adequate
notice or enable a court to review the award; nor [did] it limit
the services to those tending to limit the period of disability""'
7
and remanded on this issue."1
III.

LICENSE REVOCATION

In South CarolinaReal Estate Commission v. Boineau,"8 the
South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that a real estate broker's
license may be revoked for his conduct in transactions not strictly
relating to his brokerage capacity."' The court felt so strongly
that the lower court's "clearly correct" holding was proper that
it emphasized it would have dismissed the appeal "except for the
fact that we are of the view that an opinion has precedential value
of considerable interest to both the Commission and realtors
throughout the state."' 20
The Real Estate Commission generally characterized the
conduct that led to the revocation of Mr. Boineau's license as
follows:
Throughout [the] transactions the appellant's common
design appears, he would issue notes and make oral promises to
prevent the party he was dealing with from placing an encumbrance on the property or item. Once he had secured the property or item he would mortgage it to its maximum extent, or as
in [one] transaction deplete it, so that in any instance the
holder of the note or promise was left with no security.' 2'
114. Id. at 162, 226 S.E.2d at 708.
115. Record at 150: "IT]he defendants shall be liable for such medical costs as will
hereafter be incurred by the claimant for medical services rendered by the Durham Rehabilitation Center."
116. 267 S.C. at 162, 226 S.E.2d at 708. The court distinguished Dykes v. Daniel
Constr. Co., 262 S.C. 98, 202 S.E.2d 646 (1974), where the scope of treatment for an injured
eye was sufficiently narrow that the employer was not prejudiced by the failure to make
a more definitive award.
117. 267 S.C. at 162, 226 S.E.2d at 708.
118.
- S.C. , 230 S.E.2d 440 (1976).
119. Accord, 12 Am.JUR. 2d Brokers § 21 (1964) and cases cited therein.
120.
- S.C. at -, 230 S.E.2d at 441.
121. Brief for Respondent at 8.
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The supreme court found, by the standard of "clear and convincing evidence,"' 2 2 that the defendant's conduct in four specific
transactions 23 violated both statutory and common law standards regulating the conduct of licensed brokers, even though he
participated in the transactions in a personal, not professional,
capacity. In reaching its decision, the court analogized the position of brokers to that of attorneys. "Even as members of the bar
are subject to disciplinary procedures for conduct not strictly
related to the practice of law,' ' 2 so are brokers subject to license
revocation or suspension proceedings for conduct not strictly related to their brokerage practice. The court based its decision on
three grounds: (1) Statute, (2) legislative intent, and (3) common
25
law.'
Section 40-57-170 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina
provides in part for revocation of a broker's license if he is found
guilty of any of the following:
(1) Making any substantial misrepresentation.
(2) Making any false promises of a character likely to influence, persuade, or induce.
(3) Pursuing a continued and flagrant course of misrepresentation ....
(4) Any conduct in a real estate transaction which demonstrates bad faith, dishonesty, untrustworthiness or incompetency6 in such a manner as to endanger the interest of the pub2
lic.'
Disregarding counsel's arguments that this statute should be
strictly construed, 2 ' the court approvingly noted and adopted the
Florida Supreme Court's discussion of a similar situation:
"[I]t would be ludicrous to construe the statutes to mean that
a broker to be answerable to the Real Estate Commission must
commit the unlawful acts when engaged in real estate negotiations but should he commit the same unlawful acts when not
230 S.E.2d at 442. Although the court found clear and conS.C. at -,
122. vincing evidence, it left open the question of whether that or a preponderance is the proper
burden. Id.
230 S.E.2d at 441.
123. Id. at -,
, 230 S.E.2d at 442. See ABA Formal Opinion 336 in 60 A.B.A.J. 859
124. Id. at
(1974).
S.C. at -, 230 S.E.2d at 440-42.
125. 126. S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-57-170 (1976).
127. Brief for Appellant at 13.
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engaged in real estate negotiations he would still be of good
character and beyond the Commission's jurisdiction."''
By further relying on section 40-57-110,29 which requires
"proof of honesty, integrity, truthfulness and good reputation of
any applicant for a license,""'3 the court decried the utilization of
a -morelenient standard for disciplinary proceedings than is employed in licensing proceedings. "It does not logically follow that
an initial applicant should be required to possess higher moral
'
standards than an experienced real estate broker."''
The court also considered the legislative intent behind the
statutes, i.e., it deliberated whether or not one of the purposes for
the enactment of the statutory scheme was to outlaw the type of
conduct in which Mr. Boineau had engaged and decided affirmatively. In making such an evaluation of legislative intent, a court
must ask itself the following question: "Do the facts show a lack
of good character, competency and integrity on the part of the
licensee, or rather, an impairment of these factors to such an
extent as to create a possibility of the very mischief which the
licensing legislation seeks to avoid?' 3 2 There is a valid governmental purpose for requiring a broker to possess these characteristics of honesty and integrity: "[I]n the interest of the public
welfare, incompetent, unworthy and unscrupulous persons
[should] be excluded from the real estate brokerage business."' 3 :
In addition to the above grounds for the court's decision, "it
is generally held that a showing of dishonesty is a ground for
revocation or suspension of a real estate broker's license, whether
or not there is a statute specifically so providing."' 3 This precept
''
applies to disciplinary proceedings against an attorney as well.
Although not mentioned as such, probably the most compel128. - S.C. at __, 230 S.E.2d at 442 (quoting McKnight v. Florida Real Estate
Comm'n, 202 So. 2d 199, 200 (Fla. App. 1967).
129. S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-57-170 (1976).
130. Id.
131.
- S.C. at -,
230 S.E.2d at 442. Accord, Division of the New Jersey Real
Estate Comm'n v. Ponsi, 39 N.J. Super. 526, 121 A.2d 555 (1956).
132. S.C. at -,
230 S.E.2d at 442 (quoting 51 Ahi. JUR. 2d Licenses and
Permits § 58 (1970)).
133. Division of the New Jersey Real Estate Comm'n v. Ponsi, 39 N.J. Super. 526,
121 A.2d 555 (1956).
134. S.C. at -, 230 S.E.2d at 442 (citing 12 AM. JUR. 2d Brokers § 19 (1963)
and cases cited therein).

135.

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,

DR 1-102. See also In re Cauthen, 267 S.C.

448, 229 S.E.2d 340 (1976).
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ling justification for the holding in this case was the court's concern for the welfare of the public. As has been previously noted:
The real estate business has become a highly specialized
one and the real estate broker is now the confidant of the public
in much the same manner as the lawyer and the banker. His
relation to the public exacts the highest degree of trust and
confidence and the law imposes on [the broker] the duty of
enforcing its standards. 3 '
Because of the court's great concern for protecting the public
from the unscrupulous, this decision may have far-reaching consequences. It is quite conceivable that its tenets may be applied
to a broader class of state licensees.
Margaret Elizabeth Chastain
1:36. Ahern v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 149 Fla. 706, 6 So.2d 857 (1942).
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